We consider the class of valuations on indivisible items called gross-substitute (GS). This class was introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and is widely used in studies of markets with indivisibilities. GS is a condition on the demand-flow in a specific scenario: some items become more expensive while other items retain their price. We prove that GS implies a much stronger condition, describing the demand-flow in the general scenario in which all prices may change. We prove that the demand of GS agents always flows (weakly) downwards, i.e, from items with higher price-increase to items with lower price-increase. We show that this property is equivalent to GS and is not true when there are complementarities.
Introduction
Many markets involve a set of distinct indivisible goods that can be bought and sold for money. The analysis of such markets crucially depends on the agents' valuation functions -the functions that assign monetary values to bundles. It is common to assume that agents' valuations are weakly increasing (more goods mean weakly more value) and quasi-linear in money. Even so, without further restrictions on the valuations, the market may fail to have desirable properties such as the existence of a price-equilibrium. Kelso and Crawford [1] introduced a property of valuations which they called gross-substitutes (GS). An agent's valuation has the GS property if, when the price of an item increases, the agent's demand for other items weakly increases. In other words, a GS agent will not stop wanting an item, only because another item became more expensive. Kelso and Crawford [1] proved that a market in which all agents are GS always has a price-equilibrium. Gul and Stacchetti [2, 3] complemented this result by proving that the GS condition is, in some sense, necessary to ensure existence of a price-equilibrium. The GS condition has been widely used in the study of matching markets [4] , auctions [5] and algorithmic mechanism design [6] .
The GS condition specifies the behavior of an agent in a very specific situation: some items become more expensive, while other items retain their original price. During our research on double auctions [7] , we needed to understand how GS agents behave in the more general situation, in which the prices of all items change in different ways and in different directions. Consider two price-vectors: old and new. For every item x, define ∆ x as the price-increase of x (the new price minus the old price). Add a "null item" ∅ and set its price-increase to 0. Arrange the items vertically according to their price-increase. Then, our main result is that:
The demand of a GS agent always flows weakly downwards.
I.e, an agent may switch from wanting an item whose price increased more to an item whose priced increased less, but not vice-versa. This property is trivially true for a unit-demand agent, but it is not true when the agent regards some items as complementaries. Alice has unit-demand: she needs only one item and values each bundle as the maximum item in that bundle. Bob regards x and y as complementaries: they are worthless in separation, but together they are worth more than z. In the initial prices Alice's preferred bundle is z, and after the price-change her preferred bundle is x, so her demand flows downwards -towards the smaller price-increase.
In contrast, Bob's demand is initially x+y, and after the price-change his demand is z, so his demand flows upwards -towards the item with the larger price-increase.
Our main result is that GS agents behave like unit-demand agents in this regard: their demand flows only downwards.
Model and Notation
There is a finite set of indivisible items, M = {1, . . . , m}. There is an m-sized price-vector p: a price per item. The price of a bundle is the sum of the prices of the items in it: p(X) := x∈X p x .
The present paper focuses on a single agent with a single valuation-function u : 2 M → R. u is assumed to be weakly-increasing: if a bundle X ⊆ Y then u(X) ≤ u(Y ). It is normalized such that u(∅) = 0.
The agent's utility is quasi-linear in money. Given a utility function u and a price-vector p, the agent's net-utility function u p is: u p (X) := u(X) − p(X).
Definition 2.1. Given a valuation function u and a price-vector p, we say that a bundle P is a p-demand if it is optimal for the agent to buy this bundle when the prices are p, i.e, the set P maximizes the net-utility function u p (·) over all bundles of items: ∀X : u p (P ) ≥ u p (X). Definition 2.2. Given a valuation function u and a price-vector p, we say that an item x is p-demanded if there exists a p-demand P such that P x. Definition 2.3. Given an agent, an item x and a pair of price-vectors (p, q), we say that:
(a) The agent abandoned item x if x is p-demanded but not q-demanded. 
DDF clearly implies GS.
Proof. The DDF property implies that, if an agent abandoned an item x whose price remained constant (∆ x = 0), then the agent must have discovered some item y whose price decreased (∆ y < 0). Hence, if there is no item whose price decreased, then the agent have not abandoned any item whose price remained constant. But this is exactly the definition of the GS property.
Our main result is the converse implication: GS implies DDF.
M#-concavity
Our main technical tool is the following characterization of GS valuations [8] :
Definition 3.1. A valuation function u is M # -concave if-and-only-if, for every two bundles X, Y and for every X ⊆ X \ Y with |X | = 1 (i.e, X' is a singleton), there exists a subset Y ⊆ Y \ X with |Y | ≤ 1 (i.e, Y' is either empty or a singleton) such that:
. A valuation function u is M # -concave if-and-only-if it is gross-substitute.
Below we prove that M # -concavity is preserved in net-utility functions and marginal valuation functions. 
Hence, the M # -concave condition is independent of price:
Given a valuation u and a constant bundle Z, the marginal valuation u Z+ is a function that returns, for every bundle X that does not intersect Z, the additional value that an agent holding Z gains from having X:
Proof. The "if" direction is obvious since ∅ is also a bundle and u ∅+ ≡ u.
For the "only if" direction, suppose u is M # -concave and let Z be an arbitrary bundle. We have to prove that u Z+ is M # -concave, i.e, for all bundles X, Y with X ∩ Z = Y ∩ Z = ∅, and for every X ⊆ X \ Y with |X | = 1, there exists a Y ⊆ Y \ X with |Y | ≤ 1 such that:
Since u is M # -concave, we can apply the definition of M # -concave to the bundles Z ∪X and Z ∪Y .
This is particularly true when X = X from above, since
since it does not matter whether we first add X to Z and then remove some items from the union, or first remove these items from X and then add the remaining items to Z. Similarly, since also Y ∩ Z = ∅: (2) and (1) are equivalent.
Telescopic Arrangement of Maximizing Bundles
By definition, an agent's demanded bundles are maximizing-bundles -bundles that maximize his net-utility over all 2 m possible bundles. In addition to the global maximizing-bundles, we can consider the maximizing-bundles in each size-group, i.e, the maximizing-bundles among the bundles with 1 item, with 2 items, etc. In this section we prove that, when the agents' valuation is M # -concave, the maximizing-bundles in the different size-groups have a telescopic arrangement: each maximizing-bundle contains smaller maximizing-bundles and is contained in larger maximizingbundles.
Definition 4.1. Given valuation u on m items and a number i ∈ {0, . . . , m}, a bundle Z i is called i-maximizer of u if it maximizes u among all bundles with i items. I.e, |Z i | = i and for every other bundle X i with i items, u(Z i ) ≥ u(X i ). Proof. The lemma is obviously true when i = 0 since there is a unique 0-maximizer (the empty set). It is also true when j = m since there is a unique m-maximizer (the set containing all items). We have to prove it for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m − 1, which is possible only when m ≥ 3. The proof is by induction on m. Base: m = 3, j = 2, i = 1. Let Z 1 be a 1-maximizer and Z 2 a 2-maximizer. If Z 1 ⊆ Z 2 then we are done. Otherwise, Z 1 contains a single item, e.g. {x}, and Z 2 contains the other two items, {y, z}. Apply the M # -concavity definition with X = Z 2 and Y = Z 1 and X = {y}. Then, Y can be either ∅ or {x}:
• If Y = ∅, then by the M # -concavity condition: u({z}) + u({x, y}) ≥ u({x}) + u({y, z}).
Then {z} must be a 1-maximizer and {x, y} must be a 2-maximizer; the former is contained in Z 2 and the latter contains Z 1 so we are done.
• If Y = {x}, then by the M # -concavity condition: u({x, z}) + u({y}) ≥ u({x}) + u({y, z}). Then {y} must be a 1-maximizer and {x, z} must be a 2-maximizer; the former is contained in Z 2 and the latter contains Z 1 so we are done.
Step: we assume that the lemma is true when there are less than m items and prove that it is true for m items, where m ≥ 4. Let Z i be an i-maximizer and Z j a j-maximizer. We consider several cases.
Case 1: There is an item which is not in Z i nor in Z j . W.l.o.g. call it item 1. Let u be the restriction of u to the items {2, . . . , m}. Then Z i is an i-maximizer of u and Z j is a j-maximizer of u . By the induction assumption, the lemma is true for u . Hence, there is a j-maximizer of u , say Z j , which contains Z i . Since both Z j and Z j are j-maximizers of u , u (Z j ) = u (Z j ). Hence u(Z j ) = u(Z j ). Hence, Z j is also a j-maximizer of u, so part (a) is done. Similarly, there is an i-maximizer of u , say Z i , which is contained in Z j . Since both Z i and Z i are i-maximizers of u , u (Z i ) = u (Z i ). Hence u(Z i ) = u(Z i ). Hence, Z i is also an i-maximizer of u, so part (b) is done.
Case 2: There is an item which is in both Z i and Z j . W.l.o.g. call it item 1. Let u be the marginal valuation function u {1}+ . By Lemma 3.3, u also is M # -concave. It is a valuation function on m − 1 items, {2, . . . , m}. The bundle Z i−1 = Z i \ {1} is an (i − 1)-maximizer of u and the bundle Z j−1 = Z j \ {1} is a (j − 1)-maximizer of u . By the induction assumption the lemma is true for u . Hence, there is a j − 1-maximizer of u , say Z j−1 , which contains Z i−1 . Since both Z j−1 and Z j−1 are (j − 1)-maximizers of u , u (Z j−1 ) = u (Z j−1 ). By definition of the marginal valuation function, this equality is equivalent to: u(Z j ) = u(Z j−1 ∪ {1}). Since Z j is a j-maximizer of u, Z j−1 ∪ {1} is also a j-maximizer of u. It contains Z i−1 ∪ {1} = Z i so part (a) is done. Similarly, there is an i − 1-maximizer of u , say Z i−1 , which is contained in Z j−1 . Since both Z i−1 and Z i−1 are (i − 1)-maximizers of u , u (Z i−1 ) = u (Z i−1 ). By definition of the marginal valuation function, this equality is equivalent to:
is also an i-maximizer of u. It is contained in Z j−1 ∪ {1} = Z j so part (b) is done.
By Case 1, the lemma is true whenever i + j < m. By Case 2, the lemma is true whenever i + j > m. Case 3: i + j = m. If i + 1 < j, then i + (i + 1) < m and (i + 1) + j > m. Hence, by cases 1 and 2, there is an (i + 1)-maximizer, Z i+1 , containing Z i and an (i + 1)-maximizer, Z i+1 , contained in Z j . Again by cases 1 and 2, there is a j-maximizer Z j containing Z i+1 , and an i-maximizer Z i contained in Z i+1 . Z j contains Z i and Z i is contained in Z j so we are done.
The only case that remains is: i + j = m and i + 1 = j. In that case, m = 2i + 1 (the total number of items is odd). The case m = 3, i = 1, j = m − 1 was already handled in the Base, so we can assume that m ≥ 5, i ≥ 2, j ≤ m − 2.
Since i + (j + 1) > m, by Case 2 part (a), there exists a (j + 1)-maximizer, Z j+1 , which contains Z i . Also, j + (j + 1) > m, so by Case 2 part (b), there exists a j-maximizer, Z j , contained in Z j+1 . Starting at Z i , we added two items to create Z j+1 and then removed one item to create Z j . Since i ≥ 2, at least one item of Z i is also in Z j . Hence, Z i and Z j are covered by Case 2. By part (a), there exists a j-maximizer containing Z i .
Similarly, j + (i − 1) < m. Hence, by Case 1 part (b), there exists an (i − 1)-maximizer, Z i−1 , contained in Z j . Also, i + (i − 1) < m, so by Case 1 part (a), there exists an i-maximizer, Z i , containing Z i−1 . Starting at Z j , we removed two items to create Z i−1 and then added one item to create Z i . Since j ≤ m − 2, at least one item not in Z j is also not in Z i . Hence, Z j and Z i are covered by Case 1. By part (b), there exists an i-maximizer contained in Z j .
Uniform price change
In this section, we prove an intermediate result about the demand-flow of GS agents that may be interesting in its own right: if all items become cheaper by the same additive amount then the agent does not abandon any item, and if all items become more expensive by the same additive amount then the agent does not discover any item.
Lemma 5.1. Let p be a price-vector, d a real constant, and p another price-vector such that for every item x: p x = p x + d. If the valuation is M # -concave, then the following is true for every bundle P :
(a) If d ≤ 0 and P is a p-demand, then there exists a p -demand P ⊇ P . (b) If d ≥ 0 and P is a p -demand, then there exists a p-demand P ⊇ P .
Proof. It is obviously sufficient to prove part (a), since part (b) is its mirror-image. Let P be a p-demand and Q a p -demand. We consider two cases.
. This means that, in the move from p to p , Q gained weakly less net-utility than P . Hence, if Q is a p -demand, P is necessarily a p -demand too. P ⊇ P so we are done.
Case 2: |Q| > |P |. Let i = |P | and j = |Q|. Then, P is an i-maximizer of the net-utility function u p and Q is a j-maximizer of the net-utility function u p . But, the change in price between p and p does not affect the preference relation between bundles of the same size. Hence, P is also an i-maximizer of u p . Since j > i, by Lemma 4.1/a there exists a j-maximizer of u p that contains P . Call it P . By definition of a j-maximizer, u p (P ) ≥ u p (Q). Hence, P is also a p -demand. P ⊇ P so we are done. Proof. Let p, q be two price-vectors and ∆ x = q x −p x . We now prove part (a) in the DDF definition: if the agent abandoned an item x with ∆ x ≤ 0, then the agent must have discovered some item y with ∆ y < ∆ x . The proof of part (b) is analogous.
Consider an item x with ∆ x ≤ 0 that is p-demanded but not q-demanded. Define the pricevector p as (see Figure 1) : ∀y : p y = p y + ∆ x By Lemma 5.1(a), all items that are p-demanded, including item x, are also p -demanded.
Define the price-vector q as (see Figure 1 ):
∆ y ≤ ∆ x : q y = p y = p y + ∆ x ∆ y ≥ ∆ x : q y = p y + (∆ y − ∆ x ) = p y + ∆ y = q y Between p and q , the prices of items above x weakly increased while the prices of item x and the items below x remained the same. By the GS property, item x is q -demanded, and all items below x that were p-demanded are q -demanded. The last step of the proof -the move from q to q -is true for arbitrary valuations (not only GS). Since x was q -demanded, there was a q -demand Q that contained x. Since x is not q-demanded, Q is not a q-demand. This means that there must be a different q-demand, say Q, that became more attractive than Q , i.e, u q (Q) > u q (Q ). But u q (Q) ≤ u q (Q ), so necessarily, in the move from q to q, the bundle Q became cheaper more than Q . Since the only items that became cheaper from q to q are items with ∆ y < ∆ x , the bundle Q must contain at least one of these items y which was not previously demanded. This implies that our agent, who abandoned x, has discovered y.
